Shabbos 157 – שבת קנז

It seems that according to the first version in the Gemara, when there is no Shabbos-benefit involved, the husband is not permitted to annul his wife’s neder, even if he will no longer have the ability to so after Shabbos.  Does this place us in a peculiar situation where a wife can proceed to utter any neder on Shabbos in order to avoid her husband’s annulment?

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Shabbos 155 – שבת קנה

Rashi seems to explain that the concern with force-feeding is on account of tircha (overexertion) on Shabbos (see D”H Ela).  Notwithstanding this concern, why wouldn’t over-feeding a camel (in anticipation of a journey) or calves (to fatten them) be assur on account of Hachana (preparing for the weekday)?

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Shabbos 154 – שבת קנד

Why can’t one place cushions under the large pieces of glass (whose falling doesn’t result in significant loss) since he will shake them off, thus avoiding nullification of the kli (cushions)?

Spoiled honey is muktza, since it is only suitable for healing the animal’s wound.  It would appear from the Gemara (53b) that Refu’ah of an animal is permissible on Shabbos (see Rif). If so, why is the honey muktza if it suitable for use on Shabbos?

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Shabbos 152 – שבת קנב

In our Gemara we find Rebbi Chiya who says that (past a certain point – sealing coffin/disintegration of flesh) a Mes is unaware of what is said by people.  How is this compatible with Rebbi Chiya in Brachos (18a) who maintained that any Mes is well aware of events transpiring in this world?

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Shabbos 151 – שבת קנא

If the gentile transported an object from within the Techum, it is permissible.  Tosfos points out that this is allowed despite the fact that it was transported through a Reshus Harabim.  How is this compatible with the Mishna we learned earlier (122a) that one may not use water drawn by a gentile since it was transported from one Reshus to another?

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Shabbos 150 – שבת קנ

Rashi explains that Havdalla is akin to escorting the king on his way out; which must precede involving oneself with his personal endeavors.  However, Rashi at the outset of the Gemara (D”H V’af al gav) explains this only in reference to doing melacha prior to Havdalla (cutting fruit); why would it not apply to any personal matter as well – like going to guard his fruit?

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Shabbos 149 – שבת קמט

One may not read ‘Ksav tachas hatzurah’ for it may lead to reading of business documents (Rashi).  Is there something unique about this particular writing, or does this mean that any reading of words is assur on Shabbos?

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Shabbos 148 – שבת קמח

The Gemara asks: “If one cannot demand the return of a Yom Tov loan, then what does it mean that Shemitta is ‘Meshamet’ (since he cannot collect in any case – Rashi)”.  Rashi explained earlier that Rav Yosef is only discussing the inability to collect a Yom Tov loan through the power of Beis Din; it would seem that he is still certainly owed the money, and may rightfully collect upon his own authority.  Why can’t Shemitta be referring to the negation of that right?

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