Eruvin 13 – עירובין יג

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Today’s Daf Yomi Question:

The Gemara describes the words of both Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel as being ‘Divrei elokim chayim’ denoting that both have credence in Torah.  How does this apply to a machlokes pertaining to a practical reality?


One thought on “Eruvin 13 – עירובין יג

  1. We find in Gittin and Megilla were Eliyahu Hanavi said that all views were factual. So there might be answers that we can’t necessarily think of. There might be out-of-the-box explanations that incorporate both Shitos.

    The Maharal explains in Be’er Hagolah that not in every Machlokes do we say that both are equally correct. But there is always merit to both points and one of them is more essential. Even in the case in Gittin, about the Pilegesh Begiv’a — were Eliyahu Hanavi explained that after one event he didn’t get upset but after the second one he got angry — we see room for a Machlokes of which one is more to the core of the anger.

    When they argue about the Halacha of Klei Hamishkan of the past, we can also apply Eilu Va’eilu. They are both valid understandings of the Halacha. Just like we will inevitably Pasken only like one of them, so too in the past only one of them was actually done, Lehalacha.

    In a Machlokes about Yichus, we find that there are Yichus of the mother that is taken into account, as we find by Mordechai, Eliyahu Hanavi, and Rebbeinu Hakadosh. Many times when it says that one person is someone else, this is explained many times as being the same type of person, with the same function (like the Maharal explains in the case of Memuchan and Haman), or a Gilgul (which is a related idea), as is often explained by Mekubalim wherever Chazal mention such relationships. The Ibn Ezra implies the latter when he says thatv Bilaam can’t be Lavan. He says, perhaps it is a Sod.

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